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Introduction
Administrative data is increasingly being 
used to evaluate policy initiatives and to 
measure effectiveness of public service 
provision
E.g. school and hospital league tables in UK, 
evaluating  government policy initiatives
Topical debate in Australia at the moment  - should 
you have school league tables based on new 
NAPLAN tests?
Introduction (cont)
 BUT administrative data typically doesn’t have 
extensive background information on students, 
patients , welfare recipients etc which also 
impact on outcomes of interest
Scandinavian Administrative data exception here
Means typically have to be very careful using this 
data to inform public policy and evaluating public 
sector performance
Outline of talk
 Focus on 3 examples of how administrative data has been 
used in the UK with varying degrees of success
 Examples not randomly chosen – involve areas where I have 
current research interest BUT
 The examples I hope show why:
1. Holders of administrative data should allow researchers to 
access this data
2. Administrative data cannot  and should not be used to 
answer all questions
o and indeed one generally needs either very rich administrative 
data and/or some natural experiment coupled with a sound 
methodological approach to get the right answer
My examples
1. Using school and university administrative data to 
look at the impact of month of birth/length of 
schooling on educational outcomes
2. Using School Administrative Data to measure 
school performance 
3. Using DWP administrative data to look at whether 
ethnic minorities receive parity in treatment from 
Job Centre Plus staff (equivalent of Centrelink staff)
My examples
1. Using school and university administrative data to 
look at the impact of day of birth/length of 
schooling on educational outcomes
2. Using School Administrative Data to measure 
school performance 
3. Using DWP administrative data to look at whether 
ethnic minorities receive parity in treatment from 
Job Centre Plus staff (equivalent of Centrelink staff)
Background
 This is joint work with Claire Crawford and Costas 
Meghir and funded by the DCSF in UK
 Children in England must have started school by 
the beginning of the term after they turn five
 Local Authorities (LAs) are free to set admissions 
policies within this framework
 Single entry point, 2 entry points or 3 entry points 
 Academic year: 1st September to 31st August
 Expect children born at the end of the academic year 
to perform more poorly than children born at the 
start of the academic year – but for how long?
School, FE and HE linked data
 For two cohorts of children, we have linked school, FE 
and HE data which has academic outcomes at age 11, 
14, 16, 18 and 19/20
 Our sample includes children in state schools for 
whom we have academic results up to the end of 
compulsory schooling (age 16)
 Post 16, we see whether they gained a level 3 
qualification at 18 (pre-requisite for university 
entrance)
 Whether they started university by ages 18/19 or 19/20
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Background
 Why might this be?
 Age of sitting the test (absolute age) effect
 They are younger when they sit the tests
 Age of starting school effect
 They start school at a younger age
 Length of schooling effect
 They receive less schooling prior to the test
 Age position (relative age) effect
 They are the youngest relative to others in their class
Previous research
 Children born at the end of the academic year do 
perform worse:
 e.g. Puhani & Weber (2005), Bedard & Dhuey (2006), etc
 Some studies attempt to disentangle the effects of these 
four factors:
 But only for post-compulsory schooling outcomes
 Fredriksson & Ockert (2005)
 Black, Devereux & Salvanes (2008)
 More difficult for compulsory schooling outcomes
 Age at test = age at starting school + length of schooling
Our contribution
 Regional variation in admissions policies and regression 
discontinuity allows us to break this linear relationship 
for compulsory schooling outcomes
 Children born on the same day (who sit tests at the same 
age) start school at different ages 
 Children born on virtually the same day (1 September or 31 
August) who sit tests at different ages
 We can separately identify:
 Absolute age effect
 Age of starting school/length of schooling effect
 Age position effect 
How large is the August birth 
penalty?
Reached 
expected 
level at KS2 
(age 11)
Reached 
expected 
level at KS3 
(age 14)
Reached 
expected 
level at KS4 
(age 16)
Reached 
expected 
level at KS5 
(age 18)
College 
participation 
(age 19/20)
Boys August -0.158** 
[0.004]
-0.104** 
[0.003]
-0.068** 
[0.003]
-0.016** 
[0.003]
-0.014** 
[0.003]
September (base) 60.2 64.2 53.1 36.0 29.7
Girls August -0.151** 
[0.004]
-0.089** 
[0.003]
-0.057** 
[0.003]
-0.013** 
[0.003]
-0.015** 
[0.003]
September (base) 63.8 67.3 63.1 44.7 38.1
Notes: ** indicates significance at 1% level; * at 5% level. Standard errors are corrected for 
clustering at school level.
Model also includes controls for individual characteristics (including ethnicity, language, low income 
indicator) and neighbourhood characteristics (particularly area-based deprivation measures), plus 
cohort dummies and school fixed effects.
Summary
 August-born children experience significantly 
poorer education outcomes than September-born 
children
 Almost entirely due to differences in the age at 
which they sit the tests
 Starting school earlier/having more terms of school 
is marginally better for August born children at 
younger ages (not shown)
The policy dilemma
 Results presented emphasise August birth penalty, 
but findings also apply more generally
 On average, the younger you are the worse you do
 Ideally need to create a level playing field for all 
children regardless of date of birth
 But also need to have school years, so someone will 
always be the youngest
 Points to need to age normalise tests as day of birth 
has long lasting impacts
 Long-term consequences suggest should not do 
nothing
Australia could provide some more answers
 8 different education systems with different starting ages 
and lengths of schooling before sitting NAPLAN tests in 
years 3, 5, 7 and 9 
 In Queensland have switch from 12 to 13 years of education 
and switch in school starting age in 2007
 Analysing Australian data could separate not only age of 
sitting test effects but length of schooling versus age of 
starting school effects (cf UK)
 Age adjustment problematic as for some ages will have all 
States  represented and for other ages only one state 
(except if non-standard entry)
 May be able to use NAPLAN data to inform on best system 
and move to common system Australia wide?
But
 Researchers need to have access to Australia wide data
 UK has got that absolutely right – National Pupil 
Database widely available to researchers
 this has been beneficial to policy makers and 
researchers and has helped inform government policy
My examples
1. Using school and university administrative data to 
look at the impact of month of birth/length of 
schooling on educational outcomes
2. Using School Administrative Data to measure 
school performance 
3. Using DWP administrative data to look at whether 
ethnic minorities receive parity in treatment from 
Job Centre Plus staff (equivalent of Centrelink staff)
Hot topic in Australia at moment..
 Should NAPLAN data be used to measure school 
effectiveness?
 My  view is that NAPLAN national data should be 
open to all researchers  and if you do this then they 
will be able to construct their own league tables
 But it is very difficult to do well as the UK experience 
shows, and rankings are extremely sensitive to the 
methodological approach taken
 My view is that data is much better to look at other 
issues, and the current UK current approach is highly 
misleading and published tables of limited use
 But it could be done better..........
The UK experience
 Started by publishing raw results by school at Key Stage 2 
(end of primary school), Key Stage 4 (end of year 
compulsory schooling – GSCE results) and Key Stage 5 
(end of school – A level results)
 Clearly raw results by school affected by background of 
students attending that school and therefore not 
necessarily a measure of the value added by school
 Moved to also publishing value added (VA) and then 
contextualised value added (CVA)
VA used baseline measures of performance and CVA 
controls for other factors such as gender, ethnicity, special 
educational needs status, whether receiving free school 
meals and local area measures of deprivation
UK League tables
 At moment UK school league tables consist of:
 Proportion getting expected level at each age
 Average points score (capped and uncapped)
 Contextualized value added (1000 = expected level) –
meant to measure the value added by the school (after 
stripping out the effects of background and prior ability)
 Primary school no proper baseline for CVA (take Y2 as 
baseline even though do testing in Reception)
Does this help inform parental 
choice?
 One of the main drivers for school league tables is to identify 
failing schools, to set the right incentives for schools, and to aid 
parents in school choice
 League tables as they stand don’t do any of these things 
particularly well
 Why? 
 Differences in raw scores are largely driven by differences in 
background and prior ability rather than the school
 Even CVA,  which takes account of children’s background and prior 
ability, doesn’t tell a parent whether the school adds value for their 
child
 unless they have the average characteristics of a child attending that 
particular school and/or the school adds the same value to every child, 
regardless of background
Example
 Work I am doing with Marcello Sartarelli and Anna 
Vignoles at the IOE
 Very preliminary at this stage – but for illustrative 
purposes focus on 4 secondary schools in Essex to 
illustrate our approach and the problems with current 
league tables in UK
 Newport Free Grammar School (NF)
 Saffron Walden County High School (SW)
 William de Ferrers School (WF)
 Chelmer Valley High School (CV)
League Tables for these schools 
2006
School APS 
(uncapped)
5 A*-C 5 A*-C 
incl English &
Maths
CVA CVA 
LCI
CVA UCI
NF 400.6 65% 58% 985.2 975.3 995.1
SW 419.2 75% 65% 1010.9 1004.0 1017.8
WF 370.8 70% 63% 1000.6 994.4 1007.8
CV 376.8 66% 51% 1000.2 991.0 1009.4
Our Approach
 Assume child has these 4 schools as choices
 Given their prior achievement and characteristics 
which school should they choose?
 Use  some heavy econometrics (which I will skip) but 
does involve using GMM and relying on Conditional 
Independence Assumption to see which is best school 
given prior achievement and background 
characteristics  (following ideas in Dehejia (2005), 
Fröhlich (2008), Lechner and Smith (2007)).
 Don’t do pairwise comparisons between schools but 
multiple comparison with best (MCB) see Hsu (1996)
What we find
 If in 25th centile of Maths distribution at KS2 and 
average at English and Science then should go to any 
school but CV (with SW the best)
 If in 75th centile of Maths distribution at KS2 and 
average at English and Science then should go to any 
school but NF (with WF the best)
 Show that by reallocating 51% of students between 
these 4 schools could improve GCSE scores by 13 
points or 14% of a standard deviation. 
 Constrained so enrolments do not change – means 
second best school sometimes
 Gains are at the bottom of the distribution and  60th/70th
centile of the distribution. This is where the real 
difference in the 4 schools lie.
Mean vs Predicted GCSE scores
4 Essex Schools
Still lots to do
 But our results suggest even with years of school 
league tables informing parental choice that people 
get decisions wrong/allocation is not optimal
 But coming up with understandable, transparent ways 
of doing these league tables that are informative and a 
true reflection of school effectiveness is very difficult
 As a starting point need rich baseline data from when 
child first enters primary and secondary school
 Don’t have that in UK (and Australia?)
My examples
1. Using school and university administrative data to 
look at the impact of day of birth/length of 
schooling on educational outcomes
2. Using School Administrative Data to measure 
school performance 
3. Using DWP administrative data to look at whether 
ethnic minorities receive parity in treatment from 
Job Centre Plus staff (equivalent of Centrelink staff)
Previous work
 Considerable literature about effect of ethnicity on 
employment probability for JCP customers
 e.g. Moody (2000) for NDYP, McArdle (2001) for 
ND25plus
 Typically aim to find degree of parity in outcomes 
between different ethnic groups
 But:
 Simple regression techniques
 Small sample sizes in survey-based studies
This paper
 Joint work with Crawford, Mesnard, Shaw and 
Sianesi at IFS
 Ethnic parity:
 No difference on average between Ethnic Minority 
and “otherwise identical” White entering  the same 
JCP office and accessing same program/benefit
 Our aim:
 Get as close as possible to “otherwise identical” 
White and see what difference remains
 Calculate results for a range of JCP benefits and 
programs
Programs and Benefits
 Incapacity benefit (IB): paid to individuals who are assessed as being incapable of 
work and who meet certain National Insurance contributions conditions.
 Income support (IS): a benefit for individuals on low income; usually claimants are 
lone parents, sick or disabled, or carers.
 Jobseeker’s allowance (JSA): a benefit paid to individuals of working age who are 
unemployed, or who work fewer than 16 hours per week and are looking for full-time work.
 New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP): a voluntary programme whose aim is to 
encourage lone parents to improve their work prospects and help them into work.
 New Deal for individuals aged 25 plus (ND25plus): a programme to 
help unemployed individuals aged 25 and over to find and keep a job. Participation is 
compulsory for individuals who have been claiming JSA for at least 18 of the previous 21 
months.
 New Deal for Young People (NDYP): similar to ND25plus except that it is 
targeted on individuals aged 18-24. Participation is compulsory for those who have been 
claiming JSA for at least six months.
Controlling for selection
 Control for differences in observed characteristics 
between ethnic groups that may affect outcomes
 Data:
 Detailed labour market histories
 Individual background characteristics
 Methods:
 Primarily propensity score matching (PSM)
 Also regression-based methods and conditional 
difference in differences (DID)
 Previous LM history may have been affected by 
discrimination but nothing we can do about this
Sampling frame
 Sample selected on inflow into programme
 Addresses differential selection off programme
Sampling frame
 Sample selected on inflow into programme
 Addresses differential selection off programme
 Inflow window is 2003, allowing:
 3-year pre-inflow labour market history
 1-year follow-up
Inflow windowPrevious labour market history
Outcomes
Dec 2004Jan 2000 2003
Outcomes of interest
 Two dimensions of labour market status
 In employment (15+ days in the month)
 On benefit (15+ days in the month)
 Benefit definition includes:
 IS, IB, JSA, New Deal options, Basic Skills and Work-
Based Learning for Adults
 Measured monthly
Data
 Primarily Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study 
(WPLS)
 Benefit and employment spells for anyone on a DWP 
benefit since mid-1999
 Also contains limited demographics including sex, DOB, 
ethnicity and postcode
 Also used National Benefit Database (NBD) and 
census information
X variables
 Employment and benefit history
 Past participation in voluntary programmes
 Past participation in Basic Skills
 Individual characteristics
 Gender, age, month of inflow
 Proxies for education and wealth (from census)
 Local area characteristics (region, travel-to-work-area 
unemployment)
 Other programme-related information
What did we find?
 For most programs and benefits (with exception of IS and 
IB),  Minorities and Whites are simply too different for 
satisfactory estimates to be calculated and results are 
sensitive to the methodology used. 
MASSIVE COMMON SUPPORT PROBLEMS
 This calls into question previous results based on simple 
regression techniques, which may hide the fact that 
observationally different ethnic groups are being compared 
by parametric extrapolation. 
 In some cases, depending on method used,  eg NDLP we 
could find significant ethnic penalites in employment (raw 
and DID), no ethnic penalty (regression methods) and 
significant ethnic premium (PSM)
IB: raw labour market status
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Need other methods to do this 
properly
 Using administrative data to analyse this question very 
problematic
 Problem due to the fact that the Ethnic Minority and 
White clients accessing the same JCP office are very 
different in the UK with exception of IS and IB 
recipients
 Might not be problem in other countries but could 
be.......
Conclusions
 Administrative data is going to be used more and more 
by economic researchers
 But not answer to every question and depends 
crucially on question being asked, whether there is 
some nice natural experiment (e.g. Pilot program, 
historical accident, regression discontinuity, variation 
in policy by area) and the richness and reliability of 
the data
 The increasing linkage of administrative data to survey 
data will also allow us to test more fully the best ways 
of using administrative data but that is another talk...
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